Colombia siempre ha sido la principal hipotesis de conflicto convencional, por que con USA, pasamos a guerra asimétrica. Pero hago notar que se mencionó las tácticas de USA de desestabilización, mediante disturbios internos, y no se menciona la enorme inversión que se hizo en adquirir 123 vehículos blindados VN4 chinos usados en orden publico, así como el hecho de que en 2010 Venezuela le compró tanto equipamiento antimotín a España que fué el numero uno a nivel mundial de esta industria. Al mismo tiempo, a la Guardia Nacional se le asignaron helicopteros adicionales y se pusieron bajo su manejo y custodia aviones Diamond con capacidades FLIR y un par de Hovercraft adquiridos a Reino Unido con capacidad de transportar efectivos y vehículos.
¿Algún link donde podamos confirmar eso que señalé? O al menos la fuente, te lo agradecería.
Fue lo mejor que encontré, pero no se si le pertenece a la Armada Bolivariana por que en una imagen aparecía este mismo modelo con las letras que decían ''Armada'', ''Hidrografo'' y la bandera de Venezuela.
Estuve mirando y no encontre lo que buscaba, a lo que me refiero es que él hace referencia a hovercraft para transporte no solo de personal sino de vehículos, y lo que se me vino a la mente fue algo así:
Chávez and the Shift in Venezuelan Conflict Hypotheses
By Andrei Serbin Pont
President Hugo Chávez came to power in Venezuela in 1998, and brought with him 15 years of political, social and economic transformation of Venezuelan society, including its armed forces. His radical shift in foreign policy lead to a re-evaluation of Venezuelan conflict hypotheses, which had long been based on the possibility of a conventional armed conflict with a neighbouring country (Colombia or Guyana), or internal conflict with irregular armed groups. As Chávez’ rhetoric became increasingly anti-North American, the idea of preparing for a US intervention in Venezuela gained strength within the ranks of government officials and Chávista officers in the military.
The framework for the development of the new conflict hypotheses was one in which Venezuela was subject to constant attacks from actors opposing the Bolivarian revolution, under the direction and support of the United States. Within this approach, not only does the United States threaten Venezuela in a traditional sense of a possible conventional conflict between both countries, but there is also the possibility that other countries are supporting such aggressions and cooperating with internal Venezuelan political actors in order to conspire to destabilize the country and destroy the revolutionary process. The lines between peace and war have been blurred. Based on documents from the Universidad Militar Bolivariana de Venezuela (Venezuela Military University), one can observe that the internal and external conflict hypotheses are no longer interpreted as standalone scenarios, but are now seen as part of a larger plot against Venezuela.
In this scheme, irregular armed groups and Venezuelan political actors initiate a destabilization campaign against the government with the support of the United States. This leads to a second phase of increased tensions with Colombia that would break out into a conventional conflict between both countries, and would be used to justify a US-led intervention in Venezuela.
Under this scenario, Venezuelan armed forces should be prepared to fight three main phases of the armed conflict.The first phase, internal destabilization, requires an increased capability in the armed forces to deal with widespread protests and engage in counter-insurgency operations. As a reflection of this, we have witnessed significant purchases from China of anti-riot gear and armoured vehicles (over 100 VN-4), purchases of helicopters (Mi-17/35/26), light attack aircraft (K-8W), and the strengthening of national intelligence agencies (both civilian and military).
The second phase would be a conventional conflict with Colombia and the initial stages of a US-led intervention, for which Venezuela has acquired large amounts of conventional weapons systems. For air capabilities and airspace defence, Venezuela acquired 24 Su-30MK2 Flanker Gs from Russia, more K-8Ws, L-15s (light attack aircraft), and a wide variety of air defence systems with Russian and Belarusian support for the creation of an integrated air defence system (includes 2000 Igla-S MANPADS, 300 Zu-23 ZOM-1–4, 11 S-125 Pechora 2M batteries, 3 BUK-M2E batteries, and one S-300 Antey 2500 battery). In the meantime, it has doubled the amount of armoured and artillery units, incorporating T-72B1 and MSTA tanks, amphibious personnel carriers and fighting vehicles (BTR-80s and BMP-3s), and launch vehicles (BM-21s and BM-30s), and is currently modernizing existing armoured vehicles. The already mentioned Russian-built helicopters are also of great importance to compensate for Colombia’s superiority in air transport capabilities. The Infantería de Marina (Marines) has also seen growth, now operating 9 brigades eqipped with a variety of armoured vehicles, artillery and helicopter gunships from China. Lastly, the Navy has seen a reduction in its size, likely the influence of Cuban naval doctrine that proposes a focus on land-based artillery and anti-ship missiles for costal defence, and vessels for exclusive use in patrolling national waters. Although not confirmed, the Navy has been negotiating the acquisition of land-based anti-ship missiles from Russia, and one of the artillery systems acquired from China also possesses the capability to launch anti-ship missiles. In this phase it is expected that Venezuela would be able to face Colombia successfully, but only resist US hostilities temporarily.
The third phase is one in which the United States has been successful in neutralizing Venezuelan conventional defences and now seeks to occupy Venezuela or set up a puppet government. Any revolutionary resistance efforts would now require the execution of an asymmetric campaign against US forces. In preparation for this, Venezuela has created the Milicia Bolivariana (Bolivarian Militia), which is composed mostly of civilian volunteers with no military background that serve in local reserve units located across the country. Interestingly, the Milicia Bolivariana does not respond to the Ministry of Defence, but directly to the President of Venezuela, which leads many to believe that it is also an instrument to balance possible opposition within Venezuelan military ranks. Futhermore, there are a variety of armed groups in Venezuela that have expressed loyalty to the government, including the “colectivos” who are organized, and armed gangs that control large sections of underprivileged neighbourhoods in Venezuela. It is believed that these groups would also contribute to resistance efforts. Venezuela has also substituted aging FN FAL rifles with AK-103s, which utilize 7.62x39mm ammunition never used in Venezuela before, yet are common amongst irregular groups in the region and are standard in the Cuban armed forces. In this scenario, the acquisition of large stocks of RPG-7s, SVD designated marksmen rifles, and Igla-S MANPADS are quite relevant, as they would provide key capabilities to counter some US systems.
To coordinate these efforts at different stages of conflict, the military has been reorganized into Regiones Estratégicas de Defensa Integral (REDI, Strategic Regions for Integral Defence), which gathers all military units from all components of the armed forces and the Milicia Bolivariana into a defined region under one command, which later responds to the Comando Estratégico Operacional de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (CEOFANB, the coordinating organ for the armed forces at a national level). REDIs are further subdivided into Zonas Operativas de Defensa Integral (ZODI, Operational Zones of Integral Defence) and Areas de Defensa Integral (ADI, Areas of Integral Defence).
Overall, Venezuela has retained key aspects of previous military doctrine and conflict hypotheses that focus on dealing with conventional military threats in the region and countering possible internal irregular groups. Nevertheless, it has also incorporated systems that can play a dual role in both previously existing conflict hypotheses as well as in the scenario of a US intervention and the executing of a resistance campaign in Venezuelan territory against occupying forces or a US-backed government.
Andrei Serbin Pont is Research Coordinator for Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES) and Regional Liaison Officer for the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, specializing in the areas of defence, security, foreign policy and human rights.
Amigo Front, en la página Maquina de Combate de 22/06/2012 salió una noticia bajo el titular "El Ministerio de Agricultura de Venezuela adquiere dos Griffon Hovercraft" donde se mencionan dos unidades, una modelo 8000TD y otra modelo AP1-88. Ya la Armada posee un 2000TD y un 1000TD.
Por cierto, se me olvidaba que la Armada también posee un Griffon 1050TD para levantamientos potamográficos, a cargo de la GNB, sumados a los dos de la Armada, el 2000TD de transporte, el 1000TD Hidrográfico y los dos nuevos, el 8000TD y el AP1-88, suman cinco en total.
Gracias por la información joseb70, pero supongo que el Griffon 8000TD y el AP1-88 estarán en servicio en el ministerio de agricultura ¿No? ¿o ellos lo compraron para la armada?
En mi opinión, es que muchas compras se hacen bajo conceptos distintos a las compras militares para poder evadir el veto norteamericano, que si bien sólo afecta a productos que tengan componentes gringos, a veces estos se molestan cuando sus aliados nos venden material, por eso no me extraña que se haya hecho la compra bajo la figura del Ministerio de Agricultura, como por ejemplo paso con 6 aviones Diamond con sistemas FLIR que fueron comprados para el SAR aunque en realidad permanecen bajo custodia de la GNB aunque no sé si los pilotos sean tambien GNB. En todo caso me llama la atención es que ambas naves tienen capacidad de desembarcar vehículos ligeros según el artículo.
Grupo Aéreo de Transporte N°9 de la AMB recibe su 2do avión Dornier Do 228
(Aviamil / Prensa). Cumpliendo con los plazos de entrega previstos, la compañía RUAG, entregó el pasado jueves 3 de Julio de 2014 al Grupo Aéreo de Transporte Nº 9 (GAT N°9), de la Aviación Militar Bolivariana, la segunda aeronave del modelo Dornier Do 228.
Luego de 6 días de travesía desde Alemania, la tripulación compuesta por dos pilotos alemanes y un técnico de la compañía RUAG, arribaron a las Base Aérea "El Libertador aproximadamente a las 15:30 horas, siendo esperados por los representantes del GAT Nº9 y RUAG en la rampa del Grupo Aéreo de Inteligencia, Vigilancia y Reconocimiento Nº 8.
Con esta aeronave, ya son dos las que entran a la flota de la AMB, siendo la primera recibida a finales del mes de Enero del presente año, para su uso en el sur del país, teniendo como centro de operaciones principal, la Base Aérea "José Antonio Páez" en Puerto Ayacucho, ayudando a las comunidades indígenas de la región mas alejadas, potenciando exponencialmente la capacidad de carga de pasajeros e insumos logísticos para la FANB.
Es importante señalar, que al día siguiente de la entrega, se hizo el vuelo de prueba y aceptación por parte de una tripulación mixta de pilotos del fabricante y del GAT Nº9, siendo satisfactoria al 100%.
Llegada del 2do Dornier Do 228 a la Base Aérea "El Libertador"
Cabe destacar que la AMB adquirió por medio de Veximca C.A. 10 aeronaves de este tipo, de las cuales estas dos primeras, son aparatos de la primera generación, totalmente regenerados, revisados, inspeccionados, con hélices de 5 palas de material compuesto al igual que ciertas partes del avión y pintados, con cabina analógica con ciertas adaptaciones como GPS, TCAS y piloto automático de 3 ejes llevados a cero horas para su entrega y uso por GAT Nº9. Las restantes 8 unidades que vendrán serán completamente nuevas de fabrica y serán Do 288NG, las cuales se estiman que comiencen a llegar a finales de este año o principios del 2015.
Con esta adquisición, se espera incentivar a las demás ramas aéreas de la FANB , cuestión que ya está muy avanzada según los representantes de la empresa fabricante, para unificar el uso de este tipo de transportes facilitando el soporte logístico, de mantenimiento, entrenamiento y tripulaciones de los mismos.
El Dornier Do 228 es un avión comercial bimotor de corto alcance y con características STOL, fabricado por la compañía alemana Dornier Flugzeugwerke entre 1981 y 1998. El primer prototipo realizó su primer vuelo el 21 de marzo de 1981. Puede transportar hasta 19 pasajeros o 1.710 kg de carga.
Vista frontal del Dornier Do 228
En 1983 la compañía Hindustan Aeronautics Limited compró la licencia de producción del Do 228, fabricando en la India 228 aeronaves para venderlas en el mercado asiático. Aproximadamente 270 Do 228 se construyeron en Oberpfaffenhofen (Alemania) y Kanpur (India).
En el año 2009, RUAG comenzó la fabricación del Dornier 228 New Generation (Do 228NG) en Alemania, siendo construidos el fuselaje, alas y sección de cola por Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) en Kampur, India. Básicamente es la misma aeronave con muchas mejoras tecnológicas y mejor performance, como una nueva hélice de 5 palas de materiales compuestos, cabina digital o "glass cockpit" y una mejor autonomía de vuelo.
La República Bolivariana de Venezuela y la República Popular China acordaron este lunes la creación de un nuevo satélite de "percepción remota", que sumará a los dos satélites, Simón Bolívar y Miranda, fabricados y puestos en órbita gracias a la cooperación chino-venezolana.
Nicolás Maduro Moros, Presidente de Venezuela, anunció que próximamente su país lanzará un tercer satélite de percepción remota a la órbita, mediante un nuevo contrato con la República Popular China, como parte de los acuerdos suscritos con la nación asiática.
El jefe de Estado ofreció estas declaraciones desde Fuerte Tiuna, Caracas, tras finalizar un encuentro con el presidente chino Xi Jinping, donde firmaron 38 nuevos convenios entre ambas naciones.
"Venezuela sumará de la mano de China un tercer satélite en el espacio", dijo Maduro en cadena de radio y televisión. De igual forma, añadió "la fábrica de autobuses y celulares deben continuar su curso dentro de las relaciones China Venezuela".
Actualmente, Venezuela cuenta con dos satélites: Simón Bolívar, un satélite de telecomunicaciones, y Miranda, destinado a recabar información geográfica, ambos fabricados y puestos en órbita en trabajo mancomunado con la nación asiática.
Por su parte, el vicepresidente de Planificación venezolano, Ricardo Menéndez, anunció "la expansión del cable submarino" que lanzó Venezuela en el Caribe, con el fin de aumentar la capacidad de telecomunicaciones. Aunque no se conocieron detalles sobre esta anunciada expansión, se conoce que hay planes de llevar hasta República Dominicana la conexión del cable que originalmente une al litoral venezolano con Cuba y Jamaica. La tecnología fue adquirida en China y Francia y cuenta con un recorrido total de 1.630 kilómetros.
Venezuela comprará armas a China y Rusia para “fortalecer todo el equipamiento militar”
(Caracas, 24 de julio. Noticias24) - El presidente Nicolás Maduro informó hoy que Venezuela comprará un nuevo lote de armas procedentes de Rusia y China para “fortalecer todo el equipamiento militar”.
“He conversado con el presidente Vladimir Putin y con el presidente Xi Jinping, presidentes de Rusia y de China, y muy pronto irán comisiones de trabajo para incorporar los equipos más avanzados en tecnología para fortalecer todo el equipamiento militar y el sistema de armas de la patria. Así lo anuncio”, dijo el Mandatario en medio de un acto
Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation (HAIG) posted a congratulatory message on its Weibo page which may confirmed its sale of 24 L-15 jet trainers to Venezuela.
Por ahí eh escuchado rumores de un posible interés por parte de Venezuela para adquirir fragatas y posiblemente un submarino, @Prietocol ¿Sabes algo de esto? ¿Es sólo un rumor basado en las declaraciones de maduro en el desfile naval?, porque yo lo veo lógico para sanar las falencias de la ARBV.
Comentarios
¿Algún link donde podamos confirmar eso que señalé? O al menos la fuente, te lo agradecería.
Saludos
Fue lo mejor que encontré, pero no se si le pertenece a la Armada Bolivariana por que en una imagen aparecía este mismo modelo con las letras que decían ''Armada'', ''Hidrografo'' y la bandera de Venezuela.
By Andrei Serbin Pont
President Hugo Chávez came to power in Venezuela in 1998, and brought with him 15 years of political, social and economic transformation of Venezuelan society, including its armed forces. His radical shift in foreign policy lead to a re-evaluation of Venezuelan conflict hypotheses, which had long been based on the possibility of a conventional armed conflict with a neighbouring country (Colombia or Guyana), or internal conflict with irregular armed groups. As Chávez’ rhetoric became increasingly anti-North American, the idea of preparing for a US intervention in Venezuela gained strength within the ranks of government officials and Chávista officers in the military.
The framework for the development of the new conflict hypotheses was one in which Venezuela was subject to constant attacks from actors opposing the Bolivarian revolution, under the direction and support of the United States. Within this approach, not only does the United States threaten Venezuela in a traditional sense of a possible conventional conflict between both countries, but there is also the possibility that other countries are supporting such aggressions and cooperating with internal Venezuelan political actors in order to conspire to destabilize the country and destroy the revolutionary process. The lines between peace and war have been blurred. Based on documents from the Universidad Militar Bolivariana de Venezuela (Venezuela Military University), one can observe that the internal and external conflict hypotheses are no longer interpreted as standalone scenarios, but are now seen as part of a larger plot against Venezuela.
In this scheme, irregular armed groups and Venezuelan political actors initiate a destabilization campaign against the government with the support of the United States. This leads to a second phase of increased tensions with Colombia that would break out into a conventional conflict between both countries, and would be used to justify a US-led intervention in Venezuela.
Under this scenario, Venezuelan armed forces should be prepared to fight three main phases of the armed conflict.The first phase, internal destabilization, requires an increased capability in the armed forces to deal with widespread protests and engage in counter-insurgency operations. As a reflection of this, we have witnessed significant purchases from China of anti-riot gear and armoured vehicles (over 100 VN-4), purchases of helicopters (Mi-17/35/26), light attack aircraft (K-8W), and the strengthening of national intelligence agencies (both civilian and military).
The second phase would be a conventional conflict with Colombia and the initial stages of a US-led intervention, for which Venezuela has acquired large amounts of conventional weapons systems. For air capabilities and airspace defence, Venezuela acquired 24 Su-30MK2 Flanker Gs from Russia, more K-8Ws, L-15s (light attack aircraft), and a wide variety of air defence systems with Russian and Belarusian support for the creation of an integrated air defence system (includes 2000 Igla-S MANPADS, 300 Zu-23 ZOM-1–4, 11 S-125 Pechora 2M batteries, 3 BUK-M2E batteries, and one S-300 Antey 2500 battery). In the meantime, it has doubled the amount of armoured and artillery units, incorporating T-72B1 and MSTA tanks, amphibious personnel carriers and fighting vehicles (BTR-80s and BMP-3s), and launch vehicles (BM-21s and BM-30s), and is currently modernizing existing armoured vehicles. The already mentioned Russian-built helicopters are also of great importance to compensate for Colombia’s superiority in air transport capabilities. The Infantería de Marina (Marines) has also seen growth, now operating 9 brigades eqipped with a variety of armoured vehicles, artillery and helicopter gunships from China. Lastly, the Navy has seen a reduction in its size, likely the influence of Cuban naval doctrine that proposes a focus on land-based artillery and anti-ship missiles for costal defence, and vessels for exclusive use in patrolling national waters. Although not confirmed, the Navy has been negotiating the acquisition of land-based anti-ship missiles from Russia, and one of the artillery systems acquired from China also possesses the capability to launch anti-ship missiles. In this phase it is expected that Venezuela would be able to face Colombia successfully, but only resist US hostilities temporarily.
The third phase is one in which the United States has been successful in neutralizing Venezuelan conventional defences and now seeks to occupy Venezuela or set up a puppet government. Any revolutionary resistance efforts would now require the execution of an asymmetric campaign against US forces. In preparation for this, Venezuela has created the Milicia Bolivariana (Bolivarian Militia), which is composed mostly of civilian volunteers with no military background that serve in local reserve units located across the country. Interestingly, the Milicia Bolivariana does not respond to the Ministry of Defence, but directly to the President of Venezuela, which leads many to believe that it is also an instrument to balance possible opposition within Venezuelan military ranks. Futhermore, there are a variety of armed groups in Venezuela that have expressed loyalty to the government, including the “colectivos” who are organized, and armed gangs that control large sections of underprivileged neighbourhoods in Venezuela. It is believed that these groups would also contribute to resistance efforts. Venezuela has also substituted aging FN FAL rifles with AK-103s, which utilize 7.62x39mm ammunition never used in Venezuela before, yet are common amongst irregular groups in the region and are standard in the Cuban armed forces. In this scenario, the acquisition of large stocks of RPG-7s, SVD designated marksmen rifles, and Igla-S MANPADS are quite relevant, as they would provide key capabilities to counter some US systems.
To coordinate these efforts at different stages of conflict, the military has been reorganized into Regiones Estratégicas de Defensa Integral (REDI, Strategic Regions for Integral Defence), which gathers all military units from all components of the armed forces and the Milicia Bolivariana into a defined region under one command, which later responds to the Comando Estratégico Operacional de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (CEOFANB, the coordinating organ for the armed forces at a national level). REDIs are further subdivided into Zonas Operativas de Defensa Integral (ZODI, Operational Zones of Integral Defence) and Areas de Defensa Integral (ADI, Areas of Integral Defence).
Overall, Venezuela has retained key aspects of previous military doctrine and conflict hypotheses that focus on dealing with conventional military threats in the region and countering possible internal irregular groups. Nevertheless, it has also incorporated systems that can play a dual role in both previously existing conflict hypotheses as well as in the scenario of a US intervention and the executing of a resistance campaign in Venezuelan territory against occupying forces or a US-backed government.
Andrei Serbin Pont is Research Coordinator for Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES) and Regional Liaison Officer for the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, specializing in the areas of defence, security, foreign policy and human rights.
Fuente: https://cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/chavez-and-the-shift-in-venezuelan-conflict-hypotheses
Saludos
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