JPO counters media report that F-35 cannot dogfight
The Joint Program Office (JPO) for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has taken the unusual step of publicly defending the aircraft's air-to-air capabilities following a damning media report that called into question its ability to 'dogfight' with even today's generation of jets.
In a response to the article, which appeared on the War is Boring website, the JPO said its account of a mock aerial combat sortie conducted in January in which a 'clean' F-35A was defeated by an F-16D carrying drop-tanks "[did] not tell the entire story", and that the engagement was not indicative of the mission for which the fifth-generation JSF was designed.
"The tests cited in the article were done earlier this year to test the flying qualities of the F-35 using visual combat manoeuvres to stress the system and the F-16 involved was used as a visual reference to manoeuvre against," said the JPO statement, issued on 1 July.
"While the dogfighting scenario was successful in showing the ability of the F-35 to manoeuvre to the edge of its limits without exceeding them and handle in a positive and predictable manner, the interpretation of the scenario results could be misleading. The F-35's technology is designed to engage, shoot, and kill its enemy from long distances, not necessarily in visual 'dogfighting' situations."
In its 29 June article that led to the JPO's rebuttal, War is Boring reported the experiences and opinions of the test pilot of the F-35A aircraft (AF-2) following the combat manoeuvring engagements with the F-16. In its piece, the site noted the pilot's opinion that the F-35 had a distinct energy disadvantage against the F-16, being unable to turn its nose fast enough to successfully engage the adversary aircraft at close range. This was true for either attempted short-range missile or gun kills, with the F-35 pilot having to perform manoeuvres that caused his aircraft's energy to bleed away at an unsustainable rate to stand any chance of success.
Further to this, the pilot (who is reported to have previous operational experience on the F-15E Strike Eagle) reportedly said some of the F-35 cockpit's ergonomic features (an over-large helmet for the relatively small cockpit and a lack of rearwards vision) make dogfighting difficult.
As well as being unable to shoot down the F-16 at close quarters, the pilot of the F-35 was unable to prevent himself being shot down when the tables were turned during the exercise, according to the article.
In its response, the JPO said the F-35 used in the trial was one of the oldest in the fleet and had been designed for flight sciences (aircraft handling) testing and not air-combat manoeuvring.
"Aircraft AF-2 did not have the mission systems software to use the sensors that allow the F-35 to see its enemy long before it knows the F-35 is in the area. Second, AF-2 does not have the special stealth coating that operational F-35s have that make them virtually invisible to radar. And, third, it is not equipped with the weapons or software that allow the F-35 pilot to turn, aim a weapon with the helmet, and fire at an enemy without having to point the airplane at its target," said the JPO.
"There have been numerous occasions where a four-ship of F-35s has engaged a four-ship of F-16s in simulated combat scenarios and the F-35s won each of those encounters because of its sensors, weapons, and stealth technology."
The JPO added that it was investigating the leak of the 'For Official Use Only' report that led to the article.
COMMENT
As with most issues related to the F-35, this latest controversy has split observers down the middle, with the aircraft's advocates and detractors taking diametrically opposed views - and with the truth probably somewhere in the middle.
The War is Boring article appears to have accurately recounted the test pilot's experiences and comments (as the JPO seems to be only disputing the interpretation of the pilot's findings not their authenticity) when it says the F-35 performed poorly in close-in dogfighting.
For its part, the JPO was quite correct when it stated the F-35 was never designed for dogfighting (some have postulated the aircraft would have been better designated the A-35 rather than the F-35, on account of its weighting towards the attack role), and that aircraft AF-2 used for the test was not fitted with many of the advanced systems that would likely have enabled it to defeat its adversary when fighting on its own medium- to long-range terms.
However, while the JPO can point to such discrepancies between the test pilot's comments (as they appeared in the article) and the F-35's mission set, it should be noted that many nations that cannot afford multiple aircraft types are procuring the F-35 as a multirole 'jack of all trades' to perform the full spectrum of missions.
Though advanced sensor and missile technology renders the classic dogfight less likely than at any point during the history of military aviation, rules of engagement and other considerations can sometimes require aircraft to be within visual range before engaging each other. The point the War is Boring article was trying to make, and the point the JPO has failed to refute in its rebuttal, is that aircraft do not always get to fight on their terms, and that it is no good saying that just because the F-35 is not designed to dogfight it will never have to do so.
With the F-35 set to become the dominant platform in Western (and allied) use over the coming decades (in many cases procured specifically as an F-16 replacement), its apparent lack of a close-in aerial combat capability will raise concern, especially considering the range of new 'fifth-generation' fighters coming out of Russia and China, such as the PAK-FA and J-20. This concern will persist until the F-35 is able to prove otherwise, regardless of whether the aircraft was designed to dogfight or not.
US Navy retires Prowler electronic attack aircraft after close to 45 years' service
The US Navy (USN) retired from service the last of its Grumman EA-6B Prowler electronic attack (EA) aircraft during a three-day 'sundown' ceremony at Naval Air Station (NAS) Whidbey Island in Washington state from 25 to 27 June.
The four-seat Prowler, which was developed from the twin-seat A-6 Intruder attack aircraft, first entered service with the US Navy in 1971. With the final unit (Electronic Attack Squadron [VAQ] 134) having now fully transitioned over the successor Boeing EA-18G Growler, the Prowler was withdrawn after nearly 45 years of operations.
Although a highly capable EA platform, the Prowler had for a long time been showing its age and a need for replacement.
With no real self-defence capability, the Prowler needed a fighter escort when operating in denied environments. With a relatively modest (for a jet) top speed of 556 kt, the Prowler could not keep up with the navy's modern crop of fighters, requiring them to slow down to a sub-optimum performance envelope, which is far from ideal when flying in enemy airspace.
This is not an issue for its successor, since it is based on the same F/A-18E/F Super Hornet airframe as the navy's current fleet defence fighter. As well, the Growler is capable of defending itself with air-to-air missiles and so does not need an escort in the first place.
While the transition from Prowler to Growler has largely seen the current capabilities cross-decked from one platform to the other, one issue that the navy had to deal with was the 50% reduction in the number of crew members needed. With only half as many crew members as the Prowler, one of the navy's biggest priorities was to redefine the different roles of the Growler's two-man crew. The pilot is no longer fully occupied with flying the aircraft, but instead spends much of his or her time operating the mission systems as well.
Whereas each crew station in the Prowler is fitted with specific kit for specific tasks, in the Growler both crew members have access to the full range of onboard mission systems. However, the specific systems tasked to each crew member largely depend on the mission being flown at that time.
As well as being more capable than its predecessor, the Growler is also easier to maintain, needing 1.6 man-hours of servicing per flight hour compared with 30 man-hours per flight hour for the Prowler.
At the height of its service, there were 170 Prowlers in the USN's inventory. These have been replaced by 114 Growlers.
Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corp, visits Paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., Jul. 8, 2015. The Paratroopers displayed the capabilities of the new Light Tactical All-Terrain Vehicles (LTATV) and the Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMV-R 1.1) they have been evaluating during training operations.
(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Dillon J. Heyliger)
Los UAV de la empresa General Atomics Aeronautical Systems MQ-1 Predator serán completamente retirados de la utilización operativa en 2018. Estos dispositivos, que fueron adoptados en 1996, está ahora siendo reemplazados gradualmente por el General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper, que son más grandes en tamaño, peso y mejores oportunidades para la exploración y ataque.
En 2014, la Fuerza Aérea de Estados Unidos planeaba poner fuera de servicio en 2017, pero su conclusión se pospuso por un año debido a la invasión de los militantes del "Estado islámico" en el territorio de Irak. Dron consiguió Índice MQ-1 en 2002, cuando recibió el misil Hellfire en las alas, todos producidos son más de 360 vehículos aéreos no tripulados de este tipo todavía hay en servicio 145 "Predator". (Jesús.R.G.)
La Armada de Estados Unidos cree que la presión de las prioridades que compiten en el desarrollo de la flota puede hacer para reducir la cantidad comprada anualmente de cazas en cubierta F-35 en la década de 2020. El Comandante Naval Aérea vicealmirante Mike Zapatero dice que la compra anual de aviones de combate de esta versión se puede reducir de 20 a entre 20 y 12 máquinas. "Creo que las realidades presupuestarias actuales y la prioridad dentro de la flota podrían reducir la compra anual de aviones y crear algo entre estas cifras", dijo el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e Internacionales (Washington).
Y añade que el costo de la unidad del F-35C es considerablemente más alto que el F/A-18E/F de 265 millones frente a los US $ 80-90 millones (precio de compra de 2014). Esta diferencia no es muy suave y la promesa de reducir el costo de un F-35C a 144 millones en 2020. La Armada de Estados Unidos planea comprar 369 aviones de combate F-35C para reemplazar su flota de Boeing F / A-18C / D Hornet. (Jesús.R.G.)
El ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Arabia Saudita, Adel al-Jubeir, ha anunciado esta semana la posibilidad de que el reino compre un sistema de misiles balísticos rusos de corto alcance. El periodista Zachary Keck, de la revista estadounidense 'The National Interest' analiza qué significaría este paso para EE.UU. En opinión del periodista, los comentarios de Al-Jubeir indican que Arabia Saudita está interesada en "seguir intentando abrirse camino hacia Rusia". "Durante décadas, Arabia Saudita se ha apoyado en EE.UU. para la mayoría de sus necesidades militares", destaca el analista.
"De hecho, esta sería la primera vez que Riad compre un sistema de armas importante a Rusia", agrega. Mientras tanto, prosigue Keck en su artículo para 'The National Interest', "Arabia Saudita ya opera un sistema de misiles balísticos de mediano alcance DF-21 adquirido a China". En este sentido, el autor recuerda un artículo exclusivo de la revista 'Newsweek' publicado en 2014, que reveló, citando a una fuente de los círculos de inteligencia, que Arabia Saudita adquirió a China misiles balísticos de mediano alcance en 2007, y lo hizo con la aprobación de los servicios secretos de EE.UU. Sin embargo, si entonces la CIA apoyó el acuerdo, "es poco probable que EE.UU. apruebe ahora una venta rusa de sistemas de misiles Iskander", sostiene el periodista. A su juicio, una de las razones por las que la CIA sancionó la venta en 2007 fue que ni EE.UU. ni Rusia producían misiles balísticos de mediano alcance, por los términos del Tratado de Fuerzas Nucleares de Alcance Intermedio.
"De hecho, EE.UU. se opuso a la venta de China a Arabia Saudita de los misiles balísticos de largo alcance DF-3", recuerda. "Además, las relaciones ruso-estadounidenses son mucho más ásperas de lo que eran las relaciones entre EE.UU. y China, sobre todo en 2007", concluye el analista. Según informó este martes el ministro de Exteriores de Arabia Saudita, Adel al-Jubeir, tras una reunión mantenida con su homólogo ruso Serguéi Lavrov, el reino pretende desarrollar las relaciones con Rusia en todos los ámbitos, incluida la cooperación técnico-militar. En particular, anunció que se está debatiendo la compra de sistemas rusos de misiles técnico-operativos Iskander. "Se están llevando a cabo estrechos contactos entre las delegaciones y especialistas militares de ambos países y se debate un amplio abanico de posibles tipos de armas de Rusia, incluidos los sistemas de misiles Iskander", reveló el ministro. (Jesús.R.G.)
Dos mujeres se gradúan en el cuerpo de operaciones especiales de EEUU
Capitán Kristen Griest (centro izquierda) y Teniente Shaye Haver (centro derecha) (Foto: AFP)
AFP. Recorrieron kilómetros de selvas y montañas con morrales de 40 Kg, saltaron de helicópteros y trabajaron 20 horas por día durante el entrenamiento más duro y extenuante del ejército estadounidense hasta que, este viernes, las dos primeras mujeres se graduaron en la Ranger School, el comando de élite de Estados Unidos.
Este hito es visto con optimismo por otras oficiales, que esperan que se abran más opciones para las mujeres en el frente de combate.
La teniente Shaye Haver y la capitán Kristen Griest enfrentaron los mismos desafíos de combate, supervivencia y resistencia que los 94 hombres que también sufrieron hasta conseguir tener su insignia de Ranger School (Escuela de Rangers, como se conoce el comando de élite estadounidense) en el uniforme.
Pero las mujeres, además, padecieron la atención de los medios y se convirtieron en símbolos del debate estadounidense sobre la pertinencia --o no-- de los puestos de combate para tropas femeninas.
“Me siento tremendamente orgullosa”, dijo la capitán retirada Sue Fulton, quien también marcó un hito en su momento cuando se convirtió en la primera mujer en graduarse de la academia militar de West Point en 1980.
Fulton formaba parte de una delegación de graduados de West Point que acudieron a Fort Benning, Georgia (sureste) para felicitar a la teniente Haver, de 25 y a la capitán Griest, de 26.
Ambas usarán la codiciada insignia de Ranger en sus uniformes, pero no se unirán al 75° Regimiento de Rangers --la unidad ligera de infantería de élite-- porque ésta aún no acepta mujeres.
Sin embargo, se están abriendo otras unidades de vanguardia. Mientras, se considera que el examen de la Escuela de Rangers es un paso clave en la carrera de una oficial.
Otra graduada de West Point en 1980, Lillian Pfluke, dijo a la AFP que la graduación de las oficiales muestra que el ejército está “aceptando a las mujeres en el corazón de su organización”.
Under study for six years, Lockheed Martin’s Hybrid Wing Body (HWB) concept is designed to carry all of the outsize cargo now airlifted the Lockheed C-5 while burning 70% less fuel than the Boeing C-17. Over-wing nacelles make iteasier to install large-diameter, fuel-efficient very-high-bypass engines.
Comentarios
JPO counters media report that F-35 cannot dogfight
The Joint Program Office (JPO) for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has taken the unusual step of publicly defending the aircraft's air-to-air capabilities following a damning media report that called into question its ability to 'dogfight' with even today's generation of jets.
In a response to the article, which appeared on the War is Boring website, the JPO said its account of a mock aerial combat sortie conducted in January in which a 'clean' F-35A was defeated by an F-16D carrying drop-tanks "[did] not tell the entire story", and that the engagement was not indicative of the mission for which the fifth-generation JSF was designed.
"The tests cited in the article were done earlier this year to test the flying qualities of the F-35 using visual combat manoeuvres to stress the system and the F-16 involved was used as a visual reference to manoeuvre against," said the JPO statement, issued on 1 July.
"While the dogfighting scenario was successful in showing the ability of the F-35 to manoeuvre to the edge of its limits without exceeding them and handle in a positive and predictable manner, the interpretation of the scenario results could be misleading. The F-35's technology is designed to engage, shoot, and kill its enemy from long distances, not necessarily in visual 'dogfighting' situations."
In its 29 June article that led to the JPO's rebuttal, War is Boring reported the experiences and opinions of the test pilot of the F-35A aircraft (AF-2) following the combat manoeuvring engagements with the F-16. In its piece, the site noted the pilot's opinion that the F-35 had a distinct energy disadvantage against the F-16, being unable to turn its nose fast enough to successfully engage the adversary aircraft at close range. This was true for either attempted short-range missile or gun kills, with the F-35 pilot having to perform manoeuvres that caused his aircraft's energy to bleed away at an unsustainable rate to stand any chance of success.
Further to this, the pilot (who is reported to have previous operational experience on the F-15E Strike Eagle) reportedly said some of the F-35 cockpit's ergonomic features (an over-large helmet for the relatively small cockpit and a lack of rearwards vision) make dogfighting difficult.
As well as being unable to shoot down the F-16 at close quarters, the pilot of the F-35 was unable to prevent himself being shot down when the tables were turned during the exercise, according to the article.
In its response, the JPO said the F-35 used in the trial was one of the oldest in the fleet and had been designed for flight sciences (aircraft handling) testing and not air-combat manoeuvring.
"Aircraft AF-2 did not have the mission systems software to use the sensors that allow the F-35 to see its enemy long before it knows the F-35 is in the area. Second, AF-2 does not have the special stealth coating that operational F-35s have that make them virtually invisible to radar. And, third, it is not equipped with the weapons or software that allow the F-35 pilot to turn, aim a weapon with the helmet, and fire at an enemy without having to point the airplane at its target," said the JPO.
"There have been numerous occasions where a four-ship of F-35s has engaged a four-ship of F-16s in simulated combat scenarios and the F-35s won each of those encounters because of its sensors, weapons, and stealth technology."
The JPO added that it was investigating the leak of the 'For Official Use Only' report that led to the article.
COMMENT
As with most issues related to the F-35, this latest controversy has split observers down the middle, with the aircraft's advocates and detractors taking diametrically opposed views - and with the truth probably somewhere in the middle.
The War is Boring article appears to have accurately recounted the test pilot's experiences and comments (as the JPO seems to be only disputing the interpretation of the pilot's findings not their authenticity) when it says the F-35 performed poorly in close-in dogfighting.
For its part, the JPO was quite correct when it stated the F-35 was never designed for dogfighting (some have postulated the aircraft would have been better designated the A-35 rather than the F-35, on account of its weighting towards the attack role), and that aircraft AF-2 used for the test was not fitted with many of the advanced systems that would likely have enabled it to defeat its adversary when fighting on its own medium- to long-range terms.
However, while the JPO can point to such discrepancies between the test pilot's comments (as they appeared in the article) and the F-35's mission set, it should be noted that many nations that cannot afford multiple aircraft types are procuring the F-35 as a multirole 'jack of all trades' to perform the full spectrum of missions.
Though advanced sensor and missile technology renders the classic dogfight less likely than at any point during the history of military aviation, rules of engagement and other considerations can sometimes require aircraft to be within visual range before engaging each other. The point the War is Boring article was trying to make, and the point the JPO has failed to refute in its rebuttal, is that aircraft do not always get to fight on their terms, and that it is no good saying that just because the F-35 is not designed to dogfight it will never have to do so.
With the F-35 set to become the dominant platform in Western (and allied) use over the coming decades (in many cases procured specifically as an F-16 replacement), its apparent lack of a close-in aerial combat capability will raise concern, especially considering the range of new 'fifth-generation' fighters coming out of Russia and China, such as the PAK-FA and J-20. This concern will persist until the F-35 is able to prove otherwise, regardless of whether the aircraft was designed to dogfight or not.
http://www.janes.com/article/52715/jpo-counters-media-report-that-f-35-cannot-dogfight
US Navy retires Prowler electronic attack aircraft after close to 45 years' service
The US Navy (USN) retired from service the last of its Grumman EA-6B Prowler electronic attack (EA) aircraft during a three-day 'sundown' ceremony at Naval Air Station (NAS) Whidbey Island in Washington state from 25 to 27 June.
The four-seat Prowler, which was developed from the twin-seat A-6 Intruder attack aircraft, first entered service with the US Navy in 1971. With the final unit (Electronic Attack Squadron [VAQ] 134) having now fully transitioned over the successor Boeing EA-18G Growler, the Prowler was withdrawn after nearly 45 years of operations.
Although a highly capable EA platform, the Prowler had for a long time been showing its age and a need for replacement.
With no real self-defence capability, the Prowler needed a fighter escort when operating in denied environments. With a relatively modest (for a jet) top speed of 556 kt, the Prowler could not keep up with the navy's modern crop of fighters, requiring them to slow down to a sub-optimum performance envelope, which is far from ideal when flying in enemy airspace.
This is not an issue for its successor, since it is based on the same F/A-18E/F Super Hornet airframe as the navy's current fleet defence fighter. As well, the Growler is capable of defending itself with air-to-air missiles and so does not need an escort in the first place.
While the transition from Prowler to Growler has largely seen the current capabilities cross-decked from one platform to the other, one issue that the navy had to deal with was the 50% reduction in the number of crew members needed. With only half as many crew members as the Prowler, one of the navy's biggest priorities was to redefine the different roles of the Growler's two-man crew. The pilot is no longer fully occupied with flying the aircraft, but instead spends much of his or her time operating the mission systems as well.
Whereas each crew station in the Prowler is fitted with specific kit for specific tasks, in the Growler both crew members have access to the full range of onboard mission systems. However, the specific systems tasked to each crew member largely depend on the mission being flown at that time.
As well as being more capable than its predecessor, the Growler is also easier to maintain, needing 1.6 man-hours of servicing per flight hour compared with 30 man-hours per flight hour for the Prowler.
At the height of its service, there were 170 Prowlers in the USN's inventory. These have been replaced by 114 Growlers.
http://www.janes.com/article/52742/us-navy-retires-prowler-electronic-attack-aircraft-after-close-to-45-years-service
Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corp, visits Paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., Jul. 8, 2015. The Paratroopers displayed the capabilities of the new Light Tactical All-Terrain Vehicles (LTATV) and the Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMV-R 1.1) they have been evaluating during training operations.
(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Dillon J. Heyliger)
Éste video está muy interesante, especialmente la primera parte: la protección láser del Humveee contra RPGs...
sábado, 15 de agosto de 2015
Los "Predators" serán retirados del servicio.
Los UAV de la empresa General Atomics Aeronautical Systems MQ-1 Predator serán completamente retirados de la utilización operativa en 2018. Estos dispositivos, que fueron adoptados en 1996, está ahora siendo reemplazados gradualmente por el General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper, que son más grandes en tamaño, peso y mejores oportunidades para la exploración y ataque.
En 2014, la Fuerza Aérea de Estados Unidos planeaba poner fuera de servicio en 2017, pero su conclusión se pospuso por un año debido a la invasión de los militantes del "Estado islámico" en el territorio de Irak. Dron consiguió Índice MQ-1 en 2002, cuando recibió el misil Hellfire en las alas, todos producidos son más de 360 vehículos aéreos no tripulados de este tipo todavía hay en servicio 145 "Predator". (Jesús.R.G.)
Traducción y edición: Jesús Ríos
F-35C se ve obligado a hacer frente a otras prioridades en la Marina de los EE.UU..
La Armada de Estados Unidos cree que la presión de las prioridades que compiten en el desarrollo de la flota puede hacer para reducir la cantidad comprada anualmente de cazas en cubierta F-35 en la década de 2020. El Comandante Naval Aérea vicealmirante Mike Zapatero dice que la compra anual de aviones de combate de esta versión se puede reducir de 20 a entre 20 y 12 máquinas. "Creo que las realidades presupuestarias actuales y la prioridad dentro de la flota podrían reducir la compra anual de aviones y crear algo entre estas cifras", dijo el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e Internacionales (Washington).
Dolor de cabeza para EE.UU.: Arabia Saudita quiere comprar misiles rusos.
"De hecho, esta sería la primera vez que Riad compre un sistema de armas importante a Rusia", agrega. Mientras tanto, prosigue Keck en su artículo para 'The National Interest', "Arabia Saudita ya opera un sistema de misiles balísticos de mediano alcance DF-21 adquirido a China". En este sentido, el autor recuerda un artículo exclusivo de la revista 'Newsweek' publicado en 2014, que reveló, citando a una fuente de los círculos de inteligencia, que Arabia Saudita adquirió a China misiles balísticos de mediano alcance en 2007, y lo hizo con la aprobación de los servicios secretos de EE.UU. Sin embargo, si entonces la CIA apoyó el acuerdo, "es poco probable que EE.UU. apruebe ahora una venta rusa de sistemas de misiles Iskander", sostiene el periodista. A su juicio, una de las razones por las que la CIA sancionó la venta en 2007 fue que ni EE.UU. ni Rusia producían misiles balísticos de mediano alcance, por los términos del Tratado de Fuerzas Nucleares de Alcance Intermedio.
"De hecho, EE.UU. se opuso a la venta de China a Arabia Saudita de los misiles balísticos de largo alcance DF-3", recuerda. "Además, las relaciones ruso-estadounidenses son mucho más ásperas de lo que eran las relaciones entre EE.UU. y China, sobre todo en 2007", concluye el analista. Según informó este martes el ministro de Exteriores de Arabia Saudita, Adel al-Jubeir, tras una reunión mantenida con su homólogo ruso Serguéi Lavrov, el reino pretende desarrollar las relaciones con Rusia en todos los ámbitos, incluida la cooperación técnico-militar. En particular, anunció que se está debatiendo la compra de sistemas rusos de misiles técnico-operativos Iskander. "Se están llevando a cabo estrechos contactos entre las delegaciones y especialistas militares de ambos países y se debate un amplio abanico de posibles tipos de armas de Rusia, incluidos los sistemas de misiles Iskander", reveló el ministro. (Jesús.R.G.)
Dos mujeres se gradúan en el cuerpo de operaciones especiales de EEUU
Capitán Kristen Griest (centro izquierda) y Teniente Shaye Haver (centro derecha) (Foto: AFP)
AFP. Recorrieron kilómetros de selvas y montañas con morrales de 40 Kg, saltaron de helicópteros y trabajaron 20 horas por día durante el entrenamiento más duro y extenuante del ejército estadounidense hasta que, este viernes, las dos primeras mujeres se graduaron en la Ranger School, el comando de élite de Estados Unidos.
Este hito es visto con optimismo por otras oficiales, que esperan que se abran más opciones para las mujeres en el frente de combate.
La teniente Shaye Haver y la capitán Kristen Griest enfrentaron los mismos desafíos de combate, supervivencia y resistencia que los 94 hombres que también sufrieron hasta conseguir tener su insignia de Ranger School (Escuela de Rangers, como se conoce el comando de élite estadounidense) en el uniforme.
Pero las mujeres, además, padecieron la atención de los medios y se convirtieron en símbolos del debate estadounidense sobre la pertinencia --o no-- de los puestos de combate para tropas femeninas.
“Me siento tremendamente orgullosa”, dijo la capitán retirada Sue Fulton, quien también marcó un hito en su momento cuando se convirtió en la primera mujer en graduarse de la academia militar de West Point en 1980.
Fulton formaba parte de una delegación de graduados de West Point que acudieron a Fort Benning, Georgia (sureste) para felicitar a la teniente Haver, de 25 y a la capitán Griest, de 26.
Ambas usarán la codiciada insignia de Ranger en sus uniformes, pero no se unirán al 75° Regimiento de Rangers --la unidad ligera de infantería de élite-- porque ésta aún no acepta mujeres.
Sin embargo, se están abriendo otras unidades de vanguardia. Mientras, se considera que el examen de la Escuela de Rangers es un paso clave en la carrera de una oficial.
Otra graduada de West Point en 1980, Lillian Pfluke, dijo a la AFP que la graduación de las oficiales muestra que el ejército está “aceptando a las mujeres en el corazón de su organización”.
Lockheed Martin y su división archifamosa, Skunk Works, presenta el carguero del futuro...
Supongo que para reemplazar el C-17 Globemaster.
http://aviationweek.com/HWB#slide-0-field_images-1348431
Northrop Grumman fue seleccionada para cosntruir el proximo bombardero de largo alcance de la USAF:
http://www.globenewswire.com/newsarchive/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=10154245
http://www.americasnewbomber.com/
¿El B-3?
huhuhhu superdesembarco, super hummer
sera que los rusos le tiene que enseñar
El Pentágono desclasifica la granación de cámara de los F-14 durante el combate sobre el Golfo de Sidra contra Mig-23 Libios en 1989.
¿Enseñarles a qué?, ¿a desembarcar casi encima de un montón de turistas...???
Si tiene..... EEUU tiene 3 tipos de sistemas basados en tierra para defensa aérea a largas distacias:
GBI ( Ground-Based Interceptor ) Altitud: 1.700 Km - Alcance: 5300 Km
http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/gbi.html
THAAD: ( High Altitude Area Defence) Altitud: 150 Km - Alcance : 200 km
http://www.nknews.org/2015/03/south-korea-faces-tough-choice-on-thaad/
PAC- 3 /MSE ( Patriot Advanced Capability / Missile Segment Enhancement) Altitud: 35 km - Alcance: ???
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/articles/20130618.aspx
Estos sistemas junto con el sistema AEGIS naval, componen la defensa aérea estrategica de los EEUU: el escudo anti misiles:
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